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1. INTRODUCTION
Let us begin by renouncing two of the more ambitious implications of the
title. No, we do not believe that any single theory can do justice to all varieties
of statutory development. Nor do we believe that everything worth saying
about the processes by which statutes change can be captured by analogy to
biological evolution.
Just as each human being has a unique life history, so too statutes are born,
live, and die under circumstances that are unlikely to be duplicated. What we
are embarked on is an exercise in statutory biography: by tracing the life
histories of statutes in the environmental area, we hope to deepen our
understanding of the factors that influence the growth and development of
statutory law over time. .
In this paper, we will not attempt to summarize all our conclusions or
provide full documentation. We are presently working on a book which will
describe more comprehensively the circumstances which influenced the
development of the environmental statutes of the 1970s. Our goal at the
moment is more modest. We will describe in general terms what we have in
mind when we say that statutes "evolve" and then illustrate by describing a
particularly important period in the history ofenvironmental law. During this
period, roughly from 1965 through 1970, strong federal environmental legis-
lation was passed, although environmentalists were not yet well-organized as
a conventional interest group in Washington. Thus, the period is interesting
in its own right because it seems to contradict the usual wisdom that statutes
are passed in response to political activity by well-organized pressure groups.
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1. THE EVOLUTION OF STATUTES
By drawing this analogy between the processes by which statutes change
and biological evolution, we mean to question the vocabulary that American
lawyers typically use to describe statutory and bureaucratic lawmaking.
American lawyers talk about statutes as if they were created by a single
individual. The personification of lawmaking is built into our language: we
speak of Congress "writing" statutes. Court opinions invariably invoke the
"intent" of Congress or the "will" of the legislature-as if a complex law-
making system composed of legislative committees, a majority of535 legisla-
tors in two houses, subject to veto by the preSident, implemented by an
administrative agency ofseveral thousand bureaucrats, and subject to review
in the courts could be compared usefully to the mind of a single lawgiver.
We believe that the metaphor that statutes are "written" implies serious
misconceptions. The process by which statutory law develops is quite differ-
ent from the process by which an individual human being writes a letter or a
novel. The truth is that if a single person sat down to "write" the laws
governing environmental pollution, she would never produce the existing
legal structure.
The law regulating environmental pollution is not the creation of a single
intelligence. We will never understand why it is as it is ifwe persist in thinking
of it as the product ofa single, coherent intelligence; environmental law, like
other statutory and bureaucratic law, grows, like a living thing, in response to
forces internal and external to the legal system. Sometimes its growth is
unrestrained, like a cancer. Under other'conditions, legislation cannot sur-
vive at all.
We propose to try to model the conditions and dynamic processes by which
environmental law has developed. In adopting evolution as our central meta-
phor (Clark), we do not want to imply either that some mysterious determin-
istic mechanism is at work or that th~ interest groups and politicians who
constitute the primary actors in our story are not rational, self-conscious
beings. On the contrary, we assume that individuals and groups generally act
according to what they perceive to be their rational self-interest. Our cent.ral
point is rather that what constitutes rational, self-interested behavior changes
depending upon the structure of the environment in which an individual or
group finds itself. The structures ofthe lawmaking system and the organization
and capabilities of various interest groups affect what rational legislators
perceive to be in their self-interest. As these structures change, the incentives
confronting lawmakers do also.
By focusing on the structure of incentives, we do not mean to imply that an
individual politician's view ofgood policy is irrelevant. Our assumption is only
that before any particular individual's view ofgood policy can be enacted into
law, the structure of political incentives must be such that other rational
politicians can be persuaded to go along. This, we assert, will be a function of
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the organizational and political circumstances that exist at the time. Thus, we
believe that the structure of the political and organizational environment
selects which proposals survive in Congress to become law and which will be
stillborn.
We do not claim that the organizational and political environment implies a
unique solution, any more than the natural environment dictates that only one
type of animal will survive. Rather, we see the structure of the political
environment as constraining the choices that politicians make-to what de-
gree they are constrained is an empirical question and undoubtedly varies
from area to area and time to time. At least in federal environmental law
during the years we examine, we believe that the changing structure of
political and organizational incentives is a significant factor which goes a long
way toward explaining the distinctive form which environmental statutes
have assumed. Like the evolutionary biologist, then, we seek to correlate
existing statutory features with the environmental conditions which produce
them, rather than imagining that the forms ofstatutes reflect conscious design
choices in the mind of a single Creator who "writes" the laws.
Our evolutionary model has six stages, each associated with a distinctive
pattern of organization and incentives: Time One, the period ofcommon law
ascendancy; Time Two, the period of political cost-externalization; Time
Three, the period of pre-emptive federalization; Time Four, the period of
aspirationallawmaking; Time Five, the period of legalistic bureaucracy; and
Time Six, the period of statutory revisionism. Our analysis of each stage has
two related aspects, the first static, the second dynamic. Under the static
approach, we analyze the lawmaking institutions characteristic of each period
in an effort to describe the distinctive incentives each structure gives those
who wish to further their interests through the lawmaking system. Under the
dynamic approach, we show how each period's institutional structure carries
in it the seeds of its own destruction. We shall argue that each is stable only so
long as one or another of the relevant interests fails to solve one or another
fundamental organizational problem that confronts it in furthering its self-
interest. Once the critical strategic problems are solved, a previously less
powerful interest will influence the making of new laws that usher in a new
period, with its own distinctive lawmaking institutions, its own decision-
making incentives, and its own strategic vulnerabilities.
The ultimate aim is to provide something like a primitive moving-picture-
with one static snapshot being displaced by another as statutory law and its
political and organizational environment evolve together, each shaping the
other.
Obviously, it is impossible to develop the full panorama of the evolution of
environmental statutes in a work of the present length. However, in order to
give the reader some sense of what we mean by law and its organizational
environment evolving together, and to put our discussion of the 1965-1970
period into a broader context, we will describe briefly some of the more
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prominent features that distinguish our six evolutionary stages.
Time One, the period of common law ascendancy, is characterized by
pervasive disorganization on behalf of both polluters and environmentalists.
During Time One, there are no significant groups organized around pollution
issues. The primary lawmaking institution which addresses pollution during
Time One-<lecentralized common law courts which respond to lawsuits
brought by individuals or small groups-reflects the organizational environ-
ment. A number offactors account for the absence ofgroups organized around
pollution problems, but perhaps the most important is the lack ofinformation
connecting individual maladies with pollution. As long as pollution remains
invisible, groups cannot be organized and the period of common law ascen-
dancy continues.
A number of factors combine to destabilize common law ascendancy and
mark the transition to Time Two, the period of political cost-externalization.
As concerned scientists gradually identify the scientific basis ofpollution and
the harms which it causes, polluters lose their shield of invisibility, and it
becomes possible to organize small groups ofcitizens at the local, and eventu-
ally the state, level. The initial organization ofenvironmental groups tends to
take place in the context of the lawsuits which are the dominant form of
lawmaking then available. Thus, the existing legal structure becomes a kind of
seed crystal which helps to shape the form of the organizations which will in
turn transform existing lawmaking institutions.
Time Two, the period of political cost-externalization, is characterized by
the formation of organized groups of environmentalists at the state and local
level. Industry, however, remains passive and disorganized with regard to
pollution issues. Politicians respond to the strategic imbalance created by the
local organizational successes of environmentalists by passing laws which
place the primary costs of pollution control on out-of-state interests-hence,
our label, the period of political cost-externalization.
Time Three, which we discuss at some length in this paper, is the period of
preemptive federalization, when industry groups attempt to counter the
organizational successes of environmentalists at the state and local level
through preemptive lawmaking at the federal level.
The temporary success of industry at obtaining federal legislation in turn
provokes a counter-response by environmentalists, who possess a mass grass-
roots following but still lack a well-organized institutional structure at the
national level to counter industry lobbyists. The final section of the present
paper describes the peculiar political dynamics of Time Four, the period of
aspirationallawmaking, in which very tough environmental laws are passed
by politicians seeking to gain political advancement by appealing to these
mobilized, but poorly organized, mass publics.
The laws passed during the period ofaspirationallawmaking are responsi-
ble for changing the organizational setting and ushering in a new incentive
structure, which we call Time Five, the period oflegalistic bureaucracy. As a
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result of the successes of mass environmentalism, a new legal structure is
created which is dominated by two new players, the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) and the national environmental groups which use the
courts and the news media to challenge EPA's actions.
Thus, we maintain that the surprisingly strong environmental statutes of
the early 1970s were not passed in response to lobbying by well-organized
national environmental groups; on the contrary, it is the other way around-
the statutes ofthe early 1970s made it possible to consolidate national environ-
mental groups.
The final stage, the period of statutory revisionism, is only now beginning.
It is characterized by effective national counter-organization by industry to
deregulate and repeal parts of the legal structure created by the legislative,
judicial, and administrative victories won by environmentalists.
There is nothing magical or inevitable about our six stages. Each merely
marks a significant change in the organizational environment within which
lawmaking takes place and thus in the incentive structure which faces politi-
cians and other actors. These organizational changes help to explain why many
features of our environmental statutes are as they are. But more important,
they also illustrate a process of coevolution (Bateson: 249) in which ehanges in
organizational structure set the stage for changes in the law, and the changes
in the law set the stage for additional changes in organizational structure.
Let us now turn to one phase in the evolution of environmental law.
2. PROBLEM: ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES
OF THE 1960s AND 1970s.
An extraordinary outburst of lawmaking relating to pollution and the
environment occurred at the national level during the 1960s and 1970s as a
dozen major federal pollution control statutes were enacted. This network of
national statutes-together with a much larger body of implementing regula-
tions promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency-now consti-
ttltes one of the most pervasive systems of national regulation known to
American law. Today every discharge into the land, water or air-from the
smallest smokestack to the largest landfill for the disposal of toxic chemicals-
requires direct or indirect permission from the national government.
This comprehensive structure of environmental regulation by the federal
government is a curious feature ofAmerican law for at least two reasons. First,
it developed fairly suddenly, seemingly out of nowhere. For two centuries,
the effects of industrial pollution on the natural environment had been gener-
ally free from regulation by government, except for sporadic nuisance actions
under the common law and a few municipal ordinances to control smoke
(Bonine and McGarity, 1984: 235). Second, it is curious that the environmen-
tal law of the 1970s was made primarily at the national level, rather than by
state or municipal governments which had traditionally had legislative author-
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ity over such matters. Any theory of the evolution ofenvironmental laws must
attempt to explain how and why this "orgy of statute-making" (Gilmore: 95)
came about and why it occurred at the national level.
The environmental statutes of the 1960s and 1970s are distinctive not only
for their number but also for their content. In a variety ofways, they represent
a sharp break from the attitudes which preceded them. Consider the approach
which the Clean Air Act takes toward economics and technology, for example.
For hundreds ofyears, the common law held that no one had an absolute right
to be free from the harmful effects ofair pollution. Instead, the basic attitude
of the law was one of accommodation and "reasonableness," balancing the
harmful effects ofair pollution on the one hand against the benefits of indus-
trial activity and the availability and cost ofabatement technology on the other
(RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§826-28).
In the 1970 Clean Air Act, however, Congress staked out a more extreme
position. In setting mandatory national air quality standards, EPA is in-
structed to give no weight whatsoever to economic considerations (see Lead
Industries Assn. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, D.C. Cir. 1980, cert. denied, 101
S.Ct. 621, 1981.) Nor is the technical infeasibility of pollution controls ad-
missible as an excuse (Union Electric Co. v. Environmental Protection Agen-
cy, 427 U.S. 246, 1976). In essence, Congress declared that every American,
including particularly sensitive groups such as asthmatics (S. REP. NO. 1196,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 1970), has a statutory right to be protected from "any
known or anticipated adverse effects associated with" air pollution (Clean Air
Act, §§109(b) (1) and (2), 84 Stat. 1679, 1970, 42 U.S.C. 7409(b) (1) and (2),
1980), whatever the cost.
In pointing to the extraordinary nature of the environmental statutes of the
1970s, we do not mean to suggest that there were no precursors. On the
contrary, as will become apparent in what follows, we believe that statutes
such as the Clean Air Act of 1970 were a natural outgrowth of a lawmaking
process which began at least a decade earlier at the state level. Our point is
only that the conditions which produced the environmental statutes of the
1970s are qualitatively different from those which accounted for the pattern of
steady, incremental lawmaking during prior decades. As Krier and Ursin have
observed, "The Clean Air Amendments of 1970 ... [were] hardly ... a
tentative reaching out of the federal foot in a halting search for the route that
offered least opposition. Rather, there was a dramatic plunge forward" (298).
3. TWO FAILED HYPOTHESES:
PROBLEM-SOLVING AND INTEREST GROUP POLITICS
What accounts for this "dramatic plunge forward"? After decades of in-
crementalism and accommodation, why did Congress suddenly enact a series
of relatively extreme federal environmental statutes in the early 1970s?
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3.1 CONGRESS AS PROBLEM-SOLVER
To an environmental lawyer, one answer is immediate and obvious: Con-
gress enacted strong statutes because it recognized that the country faced an
environmental crisis.
We do not for a moment deny the seriousness of the problems that the
environmental statutes of the late 1960s and early 1970s address (Elliott
894-96). Nor is our present purpose to criticize the means by which Congress
chose to deal with the problems of pollution (Ackerman and Hassler). On
reflection, however, it should be clear that our typical environmental lawyer's
first intuition is really no answer at all.
It is a non sequitur to assert-as lawyers frequently do--that Congress
passes statutes "because" policy problems exist. The existence of a real or
perceived policy problem may be a necessary condition for the passage of a
statute, but the existence of a problem alone does not a statute make; addi-
tional conditions must be satisfied, which explains why Congress passes
statutes addressed to certain problems while other equally pressing problems
go unredressed. Conversely, when the Clean Air Act was passed, at least
some air pollution problems were getting better as a result of the gradual
substitution of oil for coal during the 1960s (Crandall: 84-85).
Lawyers fall into the trap ofassuming that statutes "respond" to problems
because they personify Congress, imagining it as a single, conscious lawgiver,
who "perceives" problems and "designs" statutory solutions. This image of
Congress may make sense from the perspective of a court construing the
"intent" of a statute (Posner: 272-73), although even that is debatable. It is
clear, however, that lawyers will never be able to understand the processes by
which statutes evolve until we break free from metaphors which imply that
"officials will automatically translate good policy into law once somebody finds
out what it [good policy] is" (Mayhew: 5).
3.2 INTEREST GROUP POLITICS
A lawyer's second thought about how environmental statutes came into
being is likely to involve a story about interest group politics.
Following a long tradition among political scientists (Truman, 1951; Lowi:
79-93) and economists (Downs; Buchanan and Tullock), lawyers frequently
see legislation as the outcome of a competitive struggle among groups with
differing interests (Holmes: 107-09)-or, in more fashionable language, as
the means used by organized "interest groups to redistribute wealth in their
favor" (Posner: 264). In its modern versions, the interest group account of
legislation almost always ends up emphasizing the degree to which one or
another group is able to organize for political action more effectively than
groups with opposing interests (Posner: 265-66; Aranson et al. 39-40). In his
HeinOnline -- 1 J. L. Econ. & Org. 320 1985
320/ JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS. AND ORGANIZATION 1:2, 1985
classic study of Congress, for example, David Mayhew asserts flatly: "Con-
gress will be reluctant to legislate new programs benefitting the unorganized
over the opposition of the organized" (137; see also Wilson: vii-xii).
It is possible to construct a plausible story about the birth of federal
environmental legislation in the late 1960s and early 1970s which is consistent
with the standard view of interest group power as directly correlated with
degree oforganization. In this hypothetical story, persons who want a cleaner
environment somehow manage to overcome their free-rider problems to
become a well-organized interest group in Washington-thereby earning the
title "environmentalists." Industry, on the other hand, remains passive on
environmental issues, at least until after the passage of major federal legis-
lation. According to this hypothesis, the "dramatic plunge forward" in federal
environmental legislation occurred because environmentalists were a well-
organized effective pressure group on environmental issues and industry was
not.
The explanation based on interest group organization would, to be sure,
require overcoming a few cherished myths. For one, we would have to de-
bunk the populist image of "Industry" as a monolith which mounts superbly
organized lobbying campaigns on every issue. It is not insuperably difficult,
however, to construct an explanation which accounts for industrial quiescence
on federal environmental issues until it was too late. In the first place, federal
environmental legislation does not affect all companies in the same way; some,
such as those which make pollution control equipment or mine the rare
minerals used in catalytic converters for automobiles, stand to benefit sub-
stantially from federal legislation and could be expected to support it (Mel-
nick: 35-36). Moreover, Herbert Simon's theory of limited or "bounded
rationality" in organizations (79-83) would predict that the vast majority of
industrial corporations would not be set up to monitor federal environmental
legislation until after they were affected by it (Melnick: 242). Finally, even ifa
company had focused on the terms ofearly federal environmental statutes, it
is unlikely that it would have been able to predict the effect which they would
ultimately have on it. These statutes only establish general frameworks. Until
the EPA promulgates air quality standards for particular pollutants and the
state plans translate these standards into emission limitations for individual
sources, it is impossible to know whether there will be substantial effect on
any particular company. One might even hypothesize that environmental
statutes were written in general terms precisely to avoid provoking significant
opposition from industrial groups (Fiorina: 71).
In short, it is possible to construct a neat little story about the content of the
early federal environmental statutes in terms of interest group politics and
organization theory-heaven only knows, we tried. There are, however, two
problems with this approach. First, it is untrue, and second, it is not very
powerful.
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A theory that explains the early federal environmental statutes in terms of
conventional interest group politics is untrue in the sense that one can detect
no striking imbalance between the organizational presence ofenviromllental-
ists and industry as lobbying forces in 1970 which might account ~r the
stringent provisions of the Clean Air Act. Ifanything, industry lobbyis seem
to have been more plentiful and better organized in Washington in 19 0 than
were the environmentalists (Environmental Action: 309-24). The political
dynamics which led to the passage of the Clean Air Act of 1970 are similar to
those identified by David Trubek and William Gillen in their study of the
National Environmental Policy Act:
The initial successes of the environmental movement in securing passage oflaws like
NEPA were not the result ofnormal group politics. Rather, these laws emerged from a
period in which mass attention had been drawn to environmental concerns through the
media and the activities of politicians and policy entrepreneurs who worked from
relatively narrow organizational bases (216).
To be sure, we do not deny that environmentalists constituted a powerful
interest group in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Our point is that they
constituted a different kind ofinterest group, one whose power derived from a
more subtle series ofinstitutional relationships than those posited by theories
which draw a direct connection between organizational structure and political
power (Schuck: 723-25).
Not only do the facts fail to confirm the standard version of interest group
theory, but the theory also lacks power to explain how and why environ-
mentalists suddenly solved their free-rider problems to emerge as a power-
ful force on the national political scene in the 1970s.
4. COLLECTIVE ACTION AND PRISONERS' DILEMMA
The model oflegislative politics as a function of the organization of interest
groups fails to account for the fact that strong environmental statutes were
passed in the early 1970s without pressure from well-organized environmen-
tal advocacy groups at the federal level. It is difficult, moreover, to explain the
rise ofnational environmental groups in terms ofprevailing theories ofvolun-
tary organization.
In order to attack these two problems, we will first consider them in the
abstract by showing that both are problems in coordinating collective action,
which may be analyzed in terms of the game of Prisoners' Dilemma. Next, we
reinterpret Prisoners' Dilemma by calling attention to certain features of the
game which have not been sufficiently appreciated. In the next section, we
return to the history of environmental statutes and environmental groups in
the early 1970s to argue that these developments can be understood in terms
of the features of Prisoners' Dilemma which we identify.
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4.1 THE PROBLEM OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
Modern theories of voluntary organization, derived from Mancur Olson
(1965), imply that national environmental groups will be difficult, if not
impossible, to organize. Large numbers of citizens, each with only a small
stake in clean air, will, if they are rational in the narrow economic sense,
decline to invest their time or money in the cause ofcleaning up the environ-
ment in the hope that they will be able to "free-ride" on the efforts ofothers
(Olson; Hardin: 11-12). Since everyone will be inclined to "let George do it,"
it won't get done at all. The paradox, ofcourse, is that everyone ends up worse
off than they would have been if they had been able to organize their actions
for their collective benefit.
It is a small step from Olson's theory of voluntary organizations to the
political corollary that the interest of citizens in a clean environment will be
systematically underrepresented in any lawmaking process in which interest
group politics plays a significant role. Individual citizens who wish to breathe
clean air are a classic example of a large, disorganized population seeking a
collective good which will benefit each individual by only a small amount
(Krier and Ursin, 1977: 262; Trubek: 156). The costs of environmental regu-
lation, on the other hand, tend to fall heavily on a relatively small number of
companies, which are already reasonably well-organized and thus presumably
less subject to free-rider problems (ibid.). According to most popular theories
ofpolitical influence, well-organized industries would be systematically over-
represented and diffuse environmentalists systematically underrepresented
in formulating policy (Mayhew: 137; see also Wilson: vii-xii). 1 How, then, is
one to explain the passage ofstrong environmental legislation in the late 1960s
and early 1970s and the rise of well-organized environmental groups on the
national level?
A number of emendations, corollaries, and exceptions to Olson's theory
have been proposed to explain the existence of environmental and other
public interest organizations. These theories have some obvious applications
to environmental advocacy organizations, but, in the final analysis, they are
not sufficient to account for the rise of environmental groups as a powerful
force on the national level.
One such theory focuses on "by-products" which can be distributed to
members in addition to the collective goods such as clean air which environ-
1. It may in fact be the case that environmental interests are systematically underrepresented
in public policy, even today. It is possible to hypothesize that even the "stringent" environmental
statutes of the 1970s were weaker than they would have been if industry had not had systematic
organizational advantages. Without some benchmark representing the legislation which would
have been adopted in an ideal world, it is impossible to measure how much legislative output has
been affected by organizational distortions. What one can say, however, is that prevailing theories
of organization do not account for the "dramatic plunge forward" in environmental legislation in
the early 1970s; that is, ifone assumes that industry had a systematic organizational advantage,
why was it rendered temporarily impotent in the early 1970s?
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mental organizations promote. By definition, nonmembers may enjoy the col-
lective goods produced by an organization without joining it. "By-products,"
on the other hand, are items such as magazines, group outings, or even simply
the psychic benefits of participation itself. Since these items can be denied
to nonmembers, they may help a group to overcome the organizational
problems identified by Olson (Hardin: 31-35). Many environmental groups
do in fact offer such side-benefits of membership.
Another explanation hypothesizes that human beings are not in fact so
narrowly "rational" and self-seeking as defined by traditional economic mod-
els. According to this theory, people can also be moved to join groups by moral
and altruistic sentiments (Hardin: 14-15; 103-24). Once again, the practice
ofenvironmental groups tends to suggest that there is some truth in this thesis
as well. At least some environmental groups couch their appeals in apocalyptic
rhetoric which suggests that the survival ofour species on this planet is at stake
in the environmental controversy ofthe moment. This is precisely what would
be expected if one were trying to stir up the maximum amount of altruistic
sentiment (Trivers: 35-57).
A third explanation is not prominent in the literature but seems at least as
important as the first two for understanding the rise of some environmental
groups. It focuses not on individual motivations but on the nature and dis-
tribution of the costs oforganizing. 2 If there are significant economies ofscale
to be achieved by multipurpose organizations, when the start-up costs of
establishing an organizational structure have been paid it may be possible for
the organization to diversify into other, related areas at only small marginal
costs. In theory, then, a purpose which would not be a sufficient incentive to
establish a voluntary association might nonetheless be taken over and per-
formed successfully by an existing group. In fact, many environmental
groups, such as the Sierra Club and the National Audubon Society, which are
engaged in lobbying and litigation on pollution issues at the national level,
were not organized for these purposes originally but took them on later after
the initial costs of establishing an organization had been paid (Bonine and
McGarity: 3).
These theories may be of some help in understanding how environmental
groups have been able to overcome the problems of collective action de-
scribed by Mancur Olson. They are not sufficiently persuasive, however, to
account for the dramatic rise of environmental groups as powerful forces on
the national scene. There is nothing in them to suggest why environmental
groups emerged when they did, or to explain how strong environmental
legislation was passed before environmental groups achieved their current
prominence as powerful lobbying forces in national politics (Crandall).
2. In a sense, the economy of scale hypothesis.is not a separate theory at all but merely a
generalization of the phenomenon which gives rise to the by-product theory. Thus, the reason
that publishing a magazine may help an environmental lobbying group to organize successfully is
that there are organizational economies of scale.
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4.2. POLmcIANs'DILEMMA
The answer, or at least a more complete answer, can be discovered by
considering the problems of environmental organizing and passing environ-
mental legislation as analogous to the game of Prisoners' Dilemma.
Prisoners' Dilemma gets its name from a story about two prisoners who are
separately interrogated about a crime. The two were the only witnesses, so if
they both refuse to testify, the worst that can happen to them is a one-year
conviction for illegal possession of firearms. However, a clever prosecutor
approaches each prisoner and offers him a proposition: "If you confess and
testify against your partner, he'll get life but you'll go free; the only hitch is
that if you both confess, you'll both get a sentence of six years for armed
robbery. I should tell you that I'm offering the same deal to your partner"
(Hardin, 1982: 2-3; Rapoport and Chammah: 24-25).
Assuming that the game is played only a single time, and assuming further
that the prisoners are rational and motivated only by self-interest, they will
both confess-and get six years in jail, rather than keep quiet and get offwith
only a year (Rapoport and Chammah: 24-25; Shubik: 37-38). The paradox, of
course, is that by pursuing their individual self-interest, the prisoners behave
in a way that is contrary to their shared collective interest in shorter sen-
tences. 3 If they could only organize their actions for their common benefit,
they would both be better off.
In his recent book on collective action, Russell Hardin has shown that the
problems offorming voluntary groups described by Olson are an application of
Prisoners' Dilemma (25-30). In classic Prisoners' Dilemma, each prisoner
confesses in an attempt to exploit his codefendant, and as a result they both
end up worse off than they would have been if they had coordinated their
actions for the collective benefit. Similarly, a citizen who wants clean air but
refrains from joining an environmental group in the hope that she can free-
ride on the efforts ofothers is also playing an exploitative strategy. She will be
best off if she gets the benefits ofclean air without paying her fair share of the
costs for this collective good; her exploitative strategy will not work, however,
ifeveryone plays the same strategy. When everyone, or nearly everyone, tries
to free-ride, they all end up worse off than they would have been if they had
been able to coordinate their actions to playa cooperative strategy.
Prisoners' Dilemma has generally been interpreted as a parable about the
difficulty oforganizing collective action. In recent years, a growing literature
has developed analyzing the conditions under which cooperative solutions to
the Prisoners' Dilemma may develop (Hardin: 155-231; Axelrod). Most of
these analyses emphasize the dynamic aspects of multiple-play or iterated
Prisoners' Dilemma. However, the standard interpretation of single-play
Prisoners' Dilemma as a story about the prisoners' inability to organize for
3. In formal terms, single-play Prisoners' Dilemma is unique among 2 x 2 games in that it is
characterized by a "stable equilibrium" which is "Pareto-deficient" (Rapoport et aI.: 28).
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their collective benefit overlooks a second, equally important, moral to the
tale, generally ignored in the literature.
We can interpret Prisoners' Dilemma not only from the standpoint of the
prisoners but also from the standpoint of the prosecutor. From the prosecu-
tor's perspective, Prisoners' Dilemma is not a story about failed organization
but about a very successful attempt to organize the actions ofthose with whom
one is in an adversarial relationship. The prosecutor is, after all, able to
motivate the two prisoners to act in a coordinated fashion-they both confess.
Before the prosecutor speaks to the two prisoners, however, a stable equilib-
rium is in place: each prisoner knows that it is in his interest to keep his mouth
shut and he has no intention of doing otherwise. By credibly threatening the
two prisoners with the possibility of a state of affairs which is substantially
worse than what they have at present-namely, a life sentence ifhis partner
confesses and he does not-the prosecutor is able to undermine the stability of
the equilibrium and motivate both prisoners to confess.
The hidden moral to the story of Prisoners' Dilemma is that forming a
voluntary organization for collective benefit is not the only way to organize
persons to engage in collective action; it is also possible to coordinate actions
by altering the structure ofincentives which motivate them. 4 It is important to
notice, moreover, that the prosecutor is not essential to the tale. She is merely
a narrative device, a convenient personification of the institutional structure
facing the prisoners. 5 It is this institutional structure, not the prosecutor as a
conscious actor, that defines the incentives facing the prisoners and explains
their otherwise inexplicable actions (Rapoport et al.: 31).
This institutional perspective helps to explain the evolution of environ-
mental law during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Not that the evolving
institutional structure technically complied with all the conditions for the
4. Hayek distinguishes two different kinds of social orders. One he calls taxis, or "made
orders," which he associates with "organizations," and the other he calls cosmos, or "spontaneous
orders," which he associates with "organisms" (35-55). At least for our purposes, the distinction
is not a viable one. Most modem theories define organizations merely as "complex pattem[s) of
communication and relationships in a group of human beings" (Simon: xvii); in other words, as
structures ofincentives which are capable of motivating coordinated human action. In this sense,
the prosecutor creates an organization through her communications with the prisoners.
5. To confirm that the payoff structure, not the prosecutor as a conscious actor, defines the
Prisoners' Dilemma, simply retell the story without the prosecutor: Two prisoners are arrested
for a crime to which they were the only witnesses; both are experienced, streetwise criminals who
immediately realize the implications of their situation: if one of them turns state's evidence, he
will get a better deal from the government; if they both confess, however they are both likely to
get stiff sentences.
Prisoners' Dilemma does not depend on self-conscious action by the prosecutor. It results
from strategic incentives which are inherent in the organization of the existing criminal law
system, which make it rational (in the short run) for the state to trade a lesser sentence for
testimony which it needs in order to win a conviction; if both defendants are willing to confess,
however, the price that the state will pay for their testimony naturally goes down.
What underlies Prisoners' Dilemma, then, is the organization of the system. The prosecutor
merely presents to the prisoners the strategic implications of the organizational structure which
she represents.
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game of Prisoners' Dilemma-in contrast to the standard game, our story
involves many relevant players, no single subset of which could have coordi-
nated their strategies in a way that guaranteed them an optimal result.
Nonetheless, like the prisoners, many of the key actors responded to institu-
tional threats of terrible outcomes by rationally choosing strategies that were
very far from first-best from their point of view. We shall, then, use the term
Politicians' DilemnUl to describe situations which are analogous to the game of
Prisoners' Dilemma in that the structure of incentives facing the players
creates a strong incentive for them to pursue a less than ideal outcome in order
to avoid an even less desirable result. We believe that institutional structures
which create the Politicians' Dilemma are a particularly important feature of
our lawmaking system, since they provide one mechanism by which Kenneth
Arrow's famous General Impossibility Theorem (1963) is resolved in practice,
as groups are forced to abandon their true preferences to coalesce around
compromise legislation.
5. POLITICIANS' DILEMMA AND ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES
The first significant federal statutes regulating air pollution, the Motor
Vehicle Pollution Control Act of 1965 (79 Stat. 992) and the Air Quality Act of
1967 (81 Stat. 485), were not passed because of the political power ofenviron-
mentalists at the national level but because two well-organized industrial
groups, the automobile industry and the soft coal industry, were threatened
with a state of affairs even worse from their perspective than federal air
pollution legislation-namely, inconsistent and progressively more stringent
environmental laws at the state and local level. As a consequence of the
structure of our federal lawmaking system, environmentalists were able to
organize industry to do their bidding for them. Thus. the first federallegisla-
tion regulating air pollution was passed not because environmentalists solved
their own organizational problems on the national level but hecause environ-
mentalists exploited the organizational difficulties of their industrial adversar-
ies at the state and local level.
The auto industry and the soft coal industry undouhtedly would have
preferred no government regulation ofair pollution rather than federal legis-
lation. When faced with the threat of inconsistent and increasingly rigorous
state laws, however, they resolved their Politicians' Dilemma by using their
superior organizational capacities in Washington to preempt or control the
environmentalists' legislative victories at the state level.
It does not matter to our argument whether environmentalists and indus-
trialists were consciously pursuing the strategy we outline. Like the charac-
ters in the Prisoners' Dilemma, they may have been simply reacting rationally
to the strategic implications oftheir situation. What we have found, in short, is
empirical support for a paradox previously elaborated by theorists of federal
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systems (Rose-Ackerman: 152-65). Rather than serving only as a mechanism
for decentralized decisionmaking, federalism also creates strategic incentives
for national lawmaking activities that would not have existed under simpler
unitary constitutions. Thus, a political chain-reaction occurred in which or-
ganized industries used their resources at the federal level to offset the
dangers posed by environmentalists' activities at the state level.
But pressure group analysis is never enough to explain the passage of a
statute. The challenge, instead, is to show how rational legislators can make
use of the changing political environment to further their own goals of re-
election and political advancement. During the period ofpreemptive federal-
ization this turns out to be a relative straightforward affair. Given the absence
of significant federal legislation, the air pollution issue was ripe for political
entrepreneurship by an ambitious legislator with presidential aspirations.
Our aspirant could point out that before his landmark legislation, the
federal government had been doing little or nothing in the war against
pollution. The fact that his initiative preempted or otherwise constrained
even more stringent state legislation could be viewed (ifit was perceived at all)
as an unfortunate side-effect of the fact that pollution was a problem that
required a coordinated national solution.
Moreover, the institutional structure of Congress provided one particular
presidential aspirant with the organizational means to appropriate the politi-
cal credit associated with a legislative breakthrough. By exercising his powers
as chairman of the relevant Senate subcommittee, Edmund Muskie could
claim credit for legislation at a time when other presidential aspirants had not
yet invested in linking their names to a cleaner environment. Thus, our period
ofpreemptive federalization reveals a second form ofpreemptive activity. Not
only did the auto and coal industries seek to preempt activist state regulation,
but Senator Muskie sought to associate his name so intimately with environ-
mental protection that he would effectively preempt efforts by rival aspirants
to claim credit for legislation on the issue.
The second phase of statutory creativity at the federal level we call Time
Four, the period ofaspirationallawmaking. It will modify both premises ofthe
preceding structure. On the level of interest group organization, local en-
vironmental activists began to credibly threaten federal politicians with elec-
toral retribution, although they were not yet organized as a coherent lobby in
Washington. As a consequence, the organizational advantage shifted away
from the hands of the Washington representatives of a few well-organized
industrial interests.
At the same time, the effort by Senator Muskie to corner the credit-
claiming market was placed in jeopardy by the entry of two rivals, Senator
Henry Jackson, principal sponsor of the National Environmental Policy Act,
and President Richard Nixon. It is this context ofcompetitive credit-claiming
that serves as the matrix generating the basic structure of environmental
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institutions ofthe present day: the National Environmental Policy Act of1969,
the Environmental Protection Agency, created in 1970, the Clean Air Act of
1970, and the Clean Water Act of 1972.
Competitive credit-claiming gives a double sense to our label of aspira-
tional lawmaking: not only did environmental aspirations take on a new
political significance as environmentalists organized at the local level, but,
because there was not yet a coherent National Clean Air Coalition with whom
a bargain could be struck, lawmaking was characterized by unrestrained
competition among presidential aspirants for the credit to be gained from
legislation assuring the public of a cleaner world. Thus, paradoxically, the
failure ofenvironmentalists to achieve full national organizat~on during Time
Four resulted in more stringent-not weaker---environmentallaws.
Our analysis of competitive credit-claiming, moreover, permits us to
glimpse the importance of a second constitutional structure in shaping the
substance ofour environmental law. Just as the period ofpreemptive federal-
ization was shaped in nonobvious ways by the constitutional division of
lawmaking power between state and nation, so too the period ofaspirational
lawmaking was shaped by several constitutional separations of lawmaking
powers: president versus Congress; House versus Senate; legislative com-
mittee versus legislative committee. It is precisely this separation of powers
that renders the question oflawmaking responsibility sufficiently problematic
so as to encourage actors at different lawmaking stages to try to capture the
lion's share of the credit to be gained from a poorly informed public.
The result of our analysis of the periods of preemptive federalization and
aspirational lawmaking will be a new perspective on some of the received
understanding about our Constitution. We have been taught to understand
the division and separation ofpowers as the basic components ofour constitu-
tional system of checks and balances. This view traditionally emphasizes the
impressive constitutional obstacle course that must be run before a bill
becomes a law. It is implicit in this view that the resulting statutory output is
both smaller and weaker than that which would arise under a simpler "major-
itarian" system. Our system is defended, however, as promoting deliberation
and as checking irrationality or tyranny.
Our analysis suggests a more complex view. Some of the time, at least, our
polycentric lawmaking system has very different structural implications: rath-
er than delay federal legislation during a lengthy period ofexperimentation on
the state level, the federal system and the difficulty of organizing interest
groups on a national level may sometimes encourage rapid and extreme
lawmaking. Instead ofchecking and balancing opposing forces, the separation
of powers may generate a system in which lawmakers compete to impress a
poorly informed public with the strength of their symbolic commitments.
Rather than prompting extended deliberation and broad consensus, our
polycentric system may emphasize the strategic manipulation of passing
organizational advantages and emotive symbolisms. The dynamic is this:
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environmental victories on the state level precipitate the counter-organiz-
ation ofcertain specifIc polluters on the the national level, which channels the
legislative activities of credit-claiming politicians in the direction of preemp-
tive federal lawmaking.
We will analyze the dynamic by fIrst showing why a federal system gives
environmentalists important strategic advantages at the state level, then
showing that the strategic situation at the national level was vastly preferable
from the polluters' point of view, and fInally showing how the strategic
interests of polluters coincided with the pursuit of political self-interest by
reelection-maximizers and presidential aspirants in the Congress.
5.1. TIME Two: THE PERIOD OF POLITICAL COST-EXTERNALIZATION
The existence of states aids environmentalists in three ways. First, and
most obvious, the existence of the states makes it possible for environmental-
ists to seek piecemeal solutions to their organizational difficulties. Not that the
effort to transcend their free-ride problems will be easy--even in smaller
states, thousands of people will have to be convinced to take seriously the
signals activists are beaming in their direction, and states such as California
and New York present the problem of organizing a population the size of
Canada's. Nonetheless, even here, the demands on a variety of resources-
from political savvy to hard cash-<lo not compare with the challenges in-
volved in achieving organizational credibility in a nation of a quarter of a
billion. Moreover, environmental groups do not form spontaneously at even
the state level. States consist of a hierarchy of smaller governmental units,
over 80,000 in total in the United States, which form a kind oflattice around
which organizations crystallize. Environmental groups tend to be comprised
of coalitions of groups which organized fIrst on a smaller scale, around local
problems or narrow interests.
Second, federalism opens up the possibility ofa distinctive credit-claiming
strategy for aspiring politicians on the state level, which we call cost-ex-
ternalization. Quite simply, dividing the nation into 6fty geographic zones
makes it almost inevitable that some pollution problems will be generated by
out-of-staters. Since midwestern auto workers don't vote on whether Califor-
nia should ban the internal combustion engine to control smog and Appala-
chian coalminers don't vote on whether New York should ban coal to control
sulfur oxides from power plant smoke stacks, these issues promise politicians
on the state level the equivalent of a free lunch-"tough" legislation allows
them to gamer public credit for bringing a benefIt to their constituents at
somebody else's expense.
Finally, as scattered environmental victories begin to appear, this evi-
dence ofsuccess will feed efforts in other states. Activists will be prompted to
continue the 6ght, rather than seek out other issues; the media and the public
will gradually begin to take greater notice and express increased interest. A
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bandwagon effect becomes possible: victories in one state may promote the
marshalling of the resources necessary for victory in another. Indeed, legisla-
tion in one state can stimulate other states to adopt even more stringent laws.
5.2. TIME THREE: PREEMPTIVE FEDERALIZATION
The Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act of 1965. The first statute
which gave the federal government regulatory power over air pollution was
the Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act of 1965. The roots of this federal
legislation run deep into the California ofthe 1950s and 1960s. The story ofthe
lawmaking process which unfolded there has been admirably told by others
(Krier and Ursin: 41-177). Suffice it to say that through a combination of a
cost-externalization strategy by California politicians, auto industry inepti-
tude, and local environmental organizing, state air pollution legislation had
begun to pose a serious threat to the automobile industry by the middle 1960s.
California had already adopted a regulatory program requiring the installation
of emission controls on all new cars sold in the state (159), an auto emissions
bill was pending in the Pennsylvania state legislature, and New York was
considering an emission standards bill even more stringent than California's
(175).
We are not presently interested in these state legislative initiatives in and
of themselves, but for the strategic incentives which they created for the
automobile industry. Unlike most other industries, the automobile industry
has strong reasons to prefer national legislation over state and local regulation
of air pollution. Most manufacturing industries would rather have state and
local governments set air pollution standards, because the political and eco-
nomic costs ofcontrolling their pollution are concentrated at the local level. It
is a rare politician who is immune to the charge that a proposal will harm a
local, job-creating industry. In addition, some manufacturing industries may
be able to play one state off against another by threatening to move their
factories out of states which set stringent air pollution standards (thereby
creating a true Prisoners' Dilemma from the standpoint of the states).
The automobile industry is in a very different strategic position, however,
because it is geographically concentrated and its product, not its factories, is
the main source of its pollution. Local politicians can set strict antipollution
standards for motor vehicles without fear of being accused of putting their
constituents out ofwork. It is true that pollution controls tend to increase the
price ofnew cars, but the connection between government action and particu-
lar price increases is only dimly perceived by voters. And unlike other
industries, Detroit could not credibly threaten to stop selling cars in Califor-
nia or other states which established stringent pollution standards. 6 More-
6. In fact, an auto industry spokesman had assured the California assembly that Detroit
would continue selling cars in California even if it banned the internal mmbuslion enl(ine
(Wicklein: 13).
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over, differing or inconsistent air pollution standards set at the state and local
level were perceived as a serious threat to Detroit's assembly lines. Finally,
the companies feared a kind of political domino effect, in which one state
legislature after another would set more and more stringent emission stan-
dards without regard to the costs or technical difficulties involved.
Ideally the auto companies would have preferred to remain free of any
substantial government regulation of pollution, but if they were going to be
regulated, federal legislation was preferable to state legislation-particularly
if federal standards were set based on technical presentations to an adminis-
trative agency rather than through symbolic appeals to cost-externalizing
politicians.
During the early 1960s, the automobile industry successfully opposed
federal emission standards for motor vehicles. In mid-1965, however, the
industry abruptly reversed its position on the ~dvice of Washington lawyer
Lloyd Cutler: provided that the federal standards would be set by an adminis-
trative agency, and provided that they would preempt any state standards
more stringent than California's, the industry would support federallegisla-
tion. 7 As a result, Senator Muskie's pending bill to have the federal govern-
ment set emission standards for motor vehicles was amended to provide that
standards would be set by HEW, rather than in the legislation itself, and
legislative history was written to leave no doubt that more stringent state laws
were preempted (Currie: 1087-89). With auto industry backing (Bonine and
McGarity: 264), the Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Act of 1965 became the
first federal statute regulating air pollution.
The Air Quality Act of 1967. The Air Quality Act of 1967 was the first
federal statute to give the federal government a significant role in regulating
air pollution from stationary sources such as factories and powerplants. Under
the 1967 act, the federal government was to promulgate criteria based on the
latest scientific evidence concerning the adverse effects ofair pollution. Each
state was then to develop its own air pollution control plan based on the
federal criteria. If any state failed to adopt a satisfactory plan, the federal
government could promulgate one for it (Martin and Symington: 244-46).
The story behind the Air Quality Act of 1967 is complicated, but here too
the threat of state and local legislation provided the impetus for a crucial
industry to acquiesce in federal legislation in the hope that it might dampen
local legislative initiatives. Like the automobile industry, the high-sulphur,
soft (bituminous) coal industry is geographically concentrated, and its pro-
duct, not its factories, constitutes the primary source of its air pollution. Soft
coal provided a logical target for local politicians anxious to place the blame for
pollution on out-of-state sources.
7. Interview with Lloyd Cutler, private attorney who represented the Automobile Man-
ufacturers' Association during the mid-I960s, September 24, 1982. See also Krier and Ursin:
173-75.
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During the mid-1960s, the soft: coal industry faced increasingly strict air
pollution regulations in the Northeast, which eventually threatened it with
the loss of a major market. In 1965, Mayor John Lindsay of New York
proposed -and despite strong opposition mounted by the coal industry, the
city council eventually passed-a program to ban the use of coal as a heating
fuel and to greatly restrict the sulfur content of coals used for other purposes
(Knowles: 30). In 1966, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Connecti-
cut announced joint plans to combat air pollution (New York Times, Dec. 18,
1966: 41). In March 1967, the threat qf strict state legislation which would
eliminate markets for high-sulft.r coals in most major metropolitan areas
increased when the federal HEW released an advisory criteria document
reviewing the scientific literature on the health risks of sulfur dioxide, a
pollutant which is formed when soft: coal is burned (Davies and Davies:
50-51).
Its unsuccessful campaign against pollution control legislation in New York
City had taught the coal industry that it was virtually impotent in local political
arenas. It did have a very powerft.1 ally in the U. S. Congress, however-
Senator Jennings Randolph of West Virginia, the nation's leading coal-pro-
ducing state. Handolph was chairman of the Senate Public Works Committee,
the parent committee for Senator Muskic's air and water pollution subcom-
mittee. It probably would be going too filr to assert that through Handolph the
soft coal industry had a veto over federal air pollution legislation-although
there have been reports that Joe Moody, chieflobbyist fllr the National Coal
Policy Conference, claimed to have written the entire 1967 Air Quality Ad
(Esposito: 279-80). Be that as it may, there is no doubt that Senator Handolph
was in "a key position to influence the legislation" (Davies and Davies: 51).
Through Randolph's intercession, a number of amendments f~\Vorable to the
soft coal industry were written into an air quality bill which Senator Muskie
proposed: HEW was directed to reconsider its report on sulftn" oxides and to
consult with an advisory committee which included industry representatives;
to undertake an extensive research program to find technological solutions to
air pollution problems; and to accompany all filture critcria documents with
recommended control techniques. (See Air Quality Act, §§104 and 107, HI
Stat. 485, 1967; Davies and Davies: 52; Krier and Ursin: 180-81.)
Ideally, the soft coal industry, like the automobile industry, probably
would have preferred that there be no government regulation ofthc pollution
produced by its product. However, if there was going to be regulation, federal
legislation offered distinct advantages to the coal industry over runaway state
and local lawmaking. While the 1967 federal Air Quality Ad did not fllrbid
states from setting air pollution standards more stringent than those recom-
mended by HEW (Martin and Symington: 259), as a practical, political
matter, the air quality criteria which HEW established based on thc latest
scientific evidence would tend to restrain state legislation. Advisory commit-
tees within the federal bureaucracy promised to be a far more hospitable
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forum for the coal industry than the politics of state and local legislatures
(Esposito: 283-87; Vietor: 148-49). Moreover, Senator Randolph's amend-
ments placed federal air pollution policy firmly on the road toward seeking
technological "fixes" to pollution problems as opposed to encouraging
switches to inherently less polluting fuels. This bias in favor of technological
solutions still dominates federal pollution policy, although its wisdom is
questionable from the standpoint of sensible national policy (Ackerman and
Hassler: 48-74). From the perspective of the high-sulfur coal industry, how-
ever, it is clearly preferable to have a federal EPA force electric utilities to
install scrubbers than to sit idly by and watch other cities and states follow
New York's lead by banning coal-burning to solve their pollution problems.
The Air Quality Act of 1967, like the Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control
Act of 1965, passed not because environmentalists were a well-organized
pressure group at the federal level, but because their efforts, and the actions of
local politicians, created a Politicians' Dilemma for a well-organized industry.
Faced with the even less desirable alternative of a significant loss of markets
through state and local legislation, the soft coal industry strongly supported
passage ofSenator Muskie's bill "with the addition of the amendments offered
by Senator Randolph" (Air Pollution-1967: Hearings on S. 780 Before the
Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution ofthe Senate Committee on Public
Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2026, 1967 [statement of W. V. Hartman,
Peabody Coal Co.]) which became the Air Quality Act of 1967. According to
the Ralph Nader study group on air pollution, the coal lobby was the only
significant interest group which lobbied for or against the bill (Esposito:
274-75).
5.3. TIME FOUR: ASPIRATIONAL LAWMAKING
A structurally similar process also accounts for some of the surprisingly
stringent provisions of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 (84 Stat. 1205). In
particular, the requirement that automobile manufacturers reduce their pol-
lution by 90 percent within five years, and the stipulation that EPA ignore
economic and technological feasibility, did not result from the success of
environmentalists at organizing a strong lobbying presence of their own in
Washington. Here too a Politicians' Dilemma was at work. The "prisoners" in
this case were politicians, primarily Senator Edmund Muskie and President
Richard Nixon. By strategically threatening these political entrepreneurs
with the loss of political capital which they had previously worked to build,
environmentalists were able to organize them to pass a statute more stringent
than the politicians really wanted. In an ideal world both Nixon and Muskie
probably would have preferred a compromise statute less likely to alienate
either industry or environmentalists, but as in Prisoners' Dilemma, they were
confronted with a situation in which they both had to choose the least-worst
situation politically.
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The structural feature which creates the Politicians' Dilemma is the frag-
mentation of the lawmaking system between Congress and the Executive,
between House and Senate, between legislative committee and legislative
committee. This division oflawmaking authority creates a situation in which
various politicians can credibly claim credit for any particular law. David
Mayhew has argued persuasively that most members of Congress can be
thought ofas "reelection maximizers." For thi's breed oflegislator, the costs of
sponsoring broad legislation such as the Clean Air Act will generally outweigh
the benefits (55-60). A smaller number oflegislators, however, aspire to run
for higher office (75-76). These aspirants may analyze the political costs
and benefits involved in environmental lawmaking in terms that are very
different from the simple reelection maximizer.
Ifhe hopes one day to gain the presidency, the aspirant must, somehow or
other, gain public recognition as a serious political leader throughout the
United States. And to this end, it will not suffice to sprinkle the home district
with dams, post offices, and similar goodies, or to help constituents with their
Social Security checks, or to return to the district for weekend orgies of
baby-kissing and speechifying. To make a national impact, the aspirant must
project an image as a statesman seriously concerned with the good of all
Americans. And from this perspective, it may make sense to invest heavily in
environmental lawmaking.
The aim, of course, is to make the aspirant's name synonymous in the
public mind with Sensible Environmental Protection. If this can be achieved,
it may be possible for the aspirant to expand the kinds ofactivities for which he
may credibly claim credit before the American people. No longer may he
merely brag to his constituents about the most recent farm subsidy he has
brought to the district. He may also credibly present himself to a nationwide
audience as the statesman who is trying to bring the American people reliefat
long last from the invisible, yet anxiety-provoking, evil of mass pollution.
The issue-oriented committee structure of Congress permits the aspirant
to hope for institutional support for his credit-claiming activity. By investing
time and energy in a particular committee, he may use the committee as a
forum to generate free publicity in the media as a spokesman for the environ-
ment. And by sitting on the relevant committee year after year, the aspirant
may in time become its chairman, thereby gaining even greater credibility for
his nationwide advertising and credit-claiming activities.
Of course, this kind of issue entrepreneurship has its hazards. First,
overinvestment in national credit-claiming runs the risk ofdefeat by a locally
oriented opponent who convinces the voters that the aspirant is ignoring the
folks back home. As a consequen<;e, the aspirant can be expected to choose his
national issues carefully, trying to invest in a national public good that will also
yield special local benefits. Second, investing symbolic capital in the environ-
ment means that the aspirant will be unable to invest in other potential issues
of national magnitude-issues that will, in turn, be the object of investments
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by competing aspirants. Since it takes years to acquire credit-claiming cred-
ibility on any particular issue, initial investments must be made under condi-
tions of uncertainty about the future state of public opinion; the aspirant's
chosen issue may not turn out to be one with which the public becomes greatly
concerned. Third, even if the environment turns out to be a particularly good
entrepreneurial investment, the aspirant who gets in on the ground floor of
the credit-claiming competition may find his position challenged by other
ambitious politicians-especially the one sitting in the White House.
Nonetheless, despite all the risks, the determined aspirant has little
choice: if he wants to gain credible national credit, he cannot behave in the
normal reelection-maximizing way. He must select a small portfolio of na-
tional issues, then invest as much as seems prudent in the positions that will
help him credibly claim credit for a successful effort to ameliorate, or even
solve, a national problem by appropriate legislation.
Throughout the 1960s, Senator Muskie carefully invested his time and
legislative effort in the environment, long before the issue achieved great
public attention. As the primary drafter of the federal air pollution statutes of
1965 and 1967, as well as several water pollution statutes, Muskie stood to gain
from the rapid rise in importance which the voting public attached to en-
vironmental issues in the early 1970s. However, because of the separation of
the lawmaking function into multiple bodies and the difficulty which the voting
public has in monitoring all the lawmaking activities in Washington, Muskie
was vulnerable to see "his" issue stolen by other politicians, particularly the
one in the White House. In addition, because most voters do not bother to
follow the details ofwhat goes on in Washington that closely, Muskie was also
vulnerable to charges from the embryonic environmental movement that he
was really "Mr. Dirty," not "Mr. Clean."
The divisions oflawmaking authority, coupled with the difficulty ofcredi-
bly communicating with the voters about the political significance of legisla-
tive activities, created a situation in which Nixon and Muskie were caught in a
Politicians' Dilemma. The result was the passage of the Clean Air Act of 1970
in a form which was more stringent than either of them would have preferred.
The Clean Air Act of1970. The Clean Air Amendments of 1970 (84 Stat.
1676) is a complex statute. There is no denying that a number of strands came
together to contribute to its passage. One factor was the realization that the
Air Quality Act of 1967 had failed to achieve its goal of cleaning up the air
(Davies and Davies: 52-53; Jones: 128-29). In addition, by 1970 there had
been an enormous increase in popular concern about the environment, fueled
in part by the attention which the issue was receiving in the press and on
television Oones: 137-55). Finally, 1970 was different from 1967 in that a
"loose coalition" of environmentalists was just beginning to organize on the
national level (Environmental Action: 309-24), although environmentalists
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were still nowhere near a match for even a single auto company's lobbyists,
either in terms of numbers or funding (311-12).
In this political environment, it would not have been surprising for Con-
gress to pass additional air pollution legislation of an incremental sort-per-
haps an increase of funding here, or a realignment of federal and state
authority there. In fact, on December 10, 1969, the leading proponent of
federal air pollution legislation, Senator Muskie, introduced just such a bill,
the Air Quality Improvement Act (S.3229, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.). Alfred
Marcus has characterized fairly Muskie's original air quality improvement bill
as "minor tinkering with the 1967 law ... [which would] not alter its provi-
sions fundamentally" (60). One section of Muskie's original bill was particu-
larly noteworthy: it "specifically stated that air pollution regulations had to be
kept within the bounds of technical knowledge and economic feasibility"
(ibid. ).
This is hardly the stuff from which one expects such a "dramatic plunge
forward" (Krier and Ursin: 298) as the Clean Air Act of1970 to emerge. Recall
that, among other things, the 1970 act ordered the automobile industry to
produce a virtually pollution-free car within five years and mandated EPA to
set national pollution standards to protect all Americans against adverse
effects from pollution with an adequate margin ofsafety irrespective ofcost or
technical feasibility. There is good evidence, moreover, that at the time the
statute passed, Senator Muskie and his colleagues were well aware that these
goals were unrealistic (Melnick: 253).
One writer has used the term "policy escalation" to refer to the process by
which Muskie's weak, original proposal was transformed into a more extreme
final statute (Ingram: 35); another has called it "speculative augmentation"
(Jones: 175-210). Whatever one calls it, what happened was essentially as
follows: on February 10, 1970, two months after Muskie had introduced his
Air Quality Improvement bill, President Nixon transmitted his own air pol-
lution proposals to Congress (Nixon: 164-67). Nixon's proposals called for
major structural changes in existing federal air pollution statutes, including
national standards for extremely hazardous air pollutants and a requirement
that states develop abatement plans to meet mandatory federal air quality
standards within one year (167).
The next significant event occurred in May 1970, when a Ralph Nader task
force published a report harshly criticizing Muskie as being soft on industry
(Esposito: 290-92). The flavor of the report is summed up by a sentence
displayed prominently on its dust jacket: "Sen. Muskie's sub-committee on
pollution and the federal laws for which it was responsible have resulted in a
'business-as-usual' license to pollute for countless companies across the coun-
try." The Nader report went on to claim that Muskie should be "stripped ofhis
title as 'Mr. Pollution Control' " (290) and to demand that he resign his
chairmanship of the air and water pollution subcommittee (292). Muskie was
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clearly stung by Nader's public criticism (Davies and Davies: 54-55; Lipp-
man and Hansen: 143-54).
In August, Muskie's subcommittee reported out a revised air quality bill
which essentially followed the outlines of Nixon's proposal but was tougher at
every tum than what the president had proposed: where Nixon's proposal
would have allowed states one year to develop their implementation plans,
Muskie's bill allowed only nine months (S. REP. NO. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 12, (1970); where the administration proposed that the auto companies
be given until 1980 to achieve a 90 percent reduction in emissions, Muskie's
subcommittee cut the deadline to 1975 (25-27); where Nixon proposed
nationwide federal air quality standards, Muskie's subcommittee added the
requirement for an additional "margin of safety" and the protection of espe-
cially sensitive groups (10); where Nixon had proposed that we do what "we
can do within the limits of existing technology" (Nixon: 164), Muskie deleted
technological or economic feasibility as a constraint (Bonine: 1975).
These surprisingly tough provisions of the Clean Air Act of 1970 did not
result. from organized lobbying by environmentalists, at least not in the
conventional sense. As a result of the Nader report, which threatened Muskie
with the loss ofhis national reputation as "Mr. Clean," both Nixon and Muskie
found themselves trapped in a Politicians' Dilemma. Both were forced to
support legislation more stringent than either would have preferred (Environ-
mental Action: 318-19).
That Nixon wanted a more moderate bill which would have imposed less of
a burden on industry is clear from the memoirs of his White House environ-
mental adviser (Whitaker: 93-95). On reflection, it should also be clear that
the Clean Air Act of 1970 was tougher than Muskie would have wanted in an
ideal world. Normally, no rational politician wants to write legislation which
unnecessarily offends any group of "relevant political actors," including in-
dustry (Mayhew: 39; Fiorina: 43-44, 71).8 Ideally, a rational politician wants
to be perceived as conferring benefits on as large a group as possible, while
harming as few as possible. The best possible outcome for Muskie would have
been to write legislation like the Air Quality Improvement Act which he
proposed initially: moderate, incremental legislation which allowed him to
retain his public reputation as "Mr. Clean" while imposing as small a burden
as possible on industry. In fact, until 1970, Muskie had followed this strategy
ofaccommodation with great success. Muskie had a long record ofworking out
private compromises with industry in his subcommittee; as a result, he
avoided controversy, and his pollution control bills usually passed unan-
imously (Lippman and Hansen: 145-50).
8. The exception occurs when there are electoral benefits to be garnered from cultivating an
image as the scourge of an unpopular group, such as Communists in the case of Senator Joe
McCarthy or the drug industry in the case of Senator Estes Kefauver.
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Muskie wrote a "tough" pollution statute in 1970, one which ran a serious
risk of alienating industry, only when he was threatened with an outcome
which was even worse from his perspective-the loss of his reputation with
the public as a crusader to clean up the environment; Nixon went along, reluc-
tantly, because the adverse political consequences of vetoing the bill were
perceived as greater than those of signing it.
The particular structural feature of the lawmaking system which environ-
mentalists were able to exploit to create the Politicians' Dilemma was the
division oflawmaking authority between president and Congress. Because of
this division (and other similar divisions, such as between the House and
Senate), it is never entirely clear to the voters that a particular politician is
responsible for particular legislation. In these circumstances, aspiring politi-
cians have incentives to compete with one another for credit with the public
for having passed "strong" environmental legislation. The Nader report was
able to compound the pressure on the politicians by exploifing the difficulty
that the public has in identifying the politicians who deserve credit for
enacting legislation in response to a perceived need.
It is important to recognize that the surprisingly strong environmental
legislation in 1970 did not result from superior organization by environmen-
talists. Indeed, it is possible to speculate that if environmentalists had been
more tightly organized as a conventional pressure group in 1970, as they later
became (Crandall), the Clean Air Act amendments might have been less,
rather than more, stringent. Had there been a well-organized environmental
lobby in 1970, Muskie could have deflected Nader's charges by giving in to its
demands. And it is quite likely that this lobby would have settled for far less
than the Great Leap Forward achieved by the Clean Air Act. In 1970,
however, no group yet existed with whom to bargain. In these circumstances,
Muskie had no way of knowing how much would be enough. He did about all
that he could have done to prove that he was more "pro-environmental" than
Nixon: he proposed a bill which was essentially Nixon's, only more so on every
point.
REFERENCES
Ackerman, Bruce A., and William T. Hassler. 1981. Clean Coal/Dirty Air. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
Aranson, Peter H., Ernest Gellhom, and Glen O. Robinson. 1982. "A Theory of
Legislative Delegation," 68 Cornell Law Review 1.
Arrow, Kenneth. 1963. Social Choice and Individual Values. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
Axelrod, Robert. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
Bateson, Gregory. 1979. Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity. New York: Bantam
Books.
HeinOnline -- 1 J. L. Econ. & Org. 339 1985
TOWARD A THEORY OF STATUTORY EVOLUTION /339
Bonine, John E. 1975. "The Evolution of 'Technology-Forcing' in the Clean Air Act,"
Environment Reporter, Monograph 21. Washington: Bureau of National Af-
fairs.
Bonine, John E., and Thomas O. McGarity. 1984. The Law ofEnvironmental Protec-
tion: Case~Legislation-Policies. St. Paul: West Publishing Co.
Buchanan, James M., and Gordon TulIock. 1967. The Calculus ofConsent .Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press.
Clark, Robert. 1977. "The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory
Evolution and Reform," 87 Yale Law Joumal90.
CrandalI, Robert W. 1983. "Air PolIution, Environmentalists and the Coal Lobby," in
Roger G. NolI and Bruce M. Owen, eds., The Political Economy ofDeregulation:
Interest Groups in the Regulatory Process. Washington: American Enterprise
Institute.
Currie, David. 1970. "Motor Vehicle Air PolIution: State Authority and Federal
Pre-Emption," 68 Michigan Law Review 1083.
Davies, J. Clarence, and Barbara S. Davies. 1977. The Politics of Pollution. Indian-
apolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co.
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory ofDemocracy. New York: Harper and
Row.
Elliott, E. Donald. 1983. "Anthropologizing Environmentalism," 92 Yale LawJoumal
888.
Environmental Action, Inc. 1971. "Clean Air Bill: Analysis ofPressure," in Sam Love,
ed., Earth Tool Kit: A Field Manual for Citizen Activists. New York: Pocket
Books.
Esposito, John C. 1970. Vanishing Air: The Ralph Nader Study Group Report on Air
Pollution. New York: Grossman Publishers, Inc.
Fiorina, Morris P. 1977. Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
Gilmore, Grant. 1977. The Ages of American Law. New Haven: Yale University
Press.
Hardin, RusselI. 1982. Collective Action. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Hayek, F. A. 1973. "Rules and Order," in Law, Legislation and Liberty. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Holmes, Oliver WendelI, Jr. 1936. "Herbert Spencer: Legislation and Empiricism,"
in H. Shriver, ed.,Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: His Book Notices, Uncollected
Letters, and Papers. New York: Central Book Co.
Ingram, Helen. 1978. "The Political Rationality of Innovation: The Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970," in Ann F. Friedlaender, ed., Approaches to Controlling
Air Pollution. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Jones, Charles O. 1975. Clean Air: The Policies and Politics of Pollution Control.
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Knowles, Clayton. 1965. "A Soft Coal Curb in City is Urged." New York Times,
October 14, 30.
Krier, James E., and Edmund Ursin. 1977. Pollution and Policy: A Case Essay on
Califomia and Federal Experience with Motor Vehicle Air Pollution, 1940-1975.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Lippman, Theo, Jr., and Donald C. Hansen. 1971. Muskie. New York: W. W. Norton
& Co.
Lowi, Theodore J. 1969. The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy and the Crisis of
Public Authority. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.
Marcus, Alfred. 1980. Promise and Performance: Choosing and Implementing an
Environmental Policy. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.
HeinOnline -- 1 J. L. Econ. & Org. 340 1985
340/ JOURNAL OF LAW. ECONOMICS. AND ORGANIZATION 1:2, 1985
Martin, Robert. and Lloyd Symington. 1968. "A Guide to the Air Quality Act of1967."
33 Law and ContemporanJ Problems 239.
Mayhew, David R. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
Melnick, R. Shep. 1983. Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean Air Act.
Washington: Brookings Institution.
Nixon, Richard M. 1970. "Environmental Quality: The President's Message to the
Congress Recommending a 37-Point Administrative and Legislative Program,"
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 160 (February 16).
Noll, Roger G., and Bruce M. Owen. 1983. The Political Economy of Deregulation:
Interest Groups in the Regulatory Process. Washington: American Enterprise
Institute.
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press.
Posner, Richard A. 1982. "Economics, Politics and the Reading of Statutes and the
Constitution," 49 University of Chicago Law Review 263.
Rapoport, Anatol, and Albert M. Chammah. 1965. Prisoners' Dilemma: A Study in
Conflict and Cooperation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
--, Melvin J. Guyer, and David G. Gordon. 1976. The 2 x 2 Game. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press.
Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1981. "Does Federalism Matter? Political Choice in a Federal
Republic," 89 Journal of Political Economy 152-65.
Schuck, Peter. 1981. "The Politics of Regulation," 90 Yale Law Journal 702.
Shubik, Martin. 1964. "Game Theory and the Study of Social Behavior: An Introduc-
tory Exposition," in Martin Shubik, ed., Game Theory and RelatedApproaches to
Social Behavior: Selections. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Simon, Herbert A. 1976. Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making
Processes in Administrative Organizations. New York: Free Press.
Trivers, Robert L. 1971. "The Evolution ofReciprocal Altruism," 46 Quarterly Review
of Biology 35-57.
Trubek, David M. 1978. "Environmental Defense, I: Introduction to Interest Group
Advocacy in Complex Disputes," in B. Weisbrod, J. Handler, and N. Komesar,
eds., Public Interest Law: An Economic and Institutional Analysis. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
---, and William J. Gillen. 1978. "Environmental Defense, II: Examining the
Limits ofInterest Group Advocacy," in B. Weisbrod, J. Handler, and N. Kome-
sar, eds., Public Interest Law: An Economic and Institutional Analysis. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Truman, David D. 1951. The Governmental Process. New York: Knopf.
Vietor, Richard H. K. 1980. Environmental Politics and the Coal Coalition. College
Station: Texax A & M University Press.
Whitaker, John C. 1976. Striking a Balance: Environment and Natural Resources
Policy in the Nixon-Ford Years. Washington: American Enterprise Institute.
Wicklein, John. 1970. "Whitewashing Detroit's Dirty Engine," 2 Washington Monthly
10.
Wilson, James Q. 1980. "Introduction," in James Q. Wilson, ed., The Politics of
Regulation. New York: Basic Books.
